Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.
Introduction
The role of compensation schemes as a device to reduce agency costs has raised academic eyebrows over the last fifteen years (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) . The recent financial crisis has intensified this criticism not only in the academic literature but also on the part of investors and regulators. Public opinion is reflected in the observation of Timothy Geithner, the former US Treasury Secretary: "This financial crisis had many significant causes, but executive compensation practices were a contributing factor. Incentives for short term gains overwhelmed the checks and balances meant to mitigate against the risk of excess leverage" (Geithner, 2009) . Whereas the relationship between the level and form of executive compensation and company performance has frequently been studied, little is known about how compensation packages and bonus schemes actually create incentives for traders.
Bonus schemes seem to play an eminent role in traders' motivation to trade and to perform well. Sometimes they evoke emotions, aspirations, and risk appetites that result in aberrant behavior, e.g., in the cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel, and Kweku Adoboli, whose fraudulent behavior cost their employers around Euro 8 billion. "Yes, I did it -but all I wanted was a bonus," commented Jérôme Kerviel on his trading loss of Euro 4.9 billion for Societe Generale (The Independent and The Times, 29 Oct. 2008) . In a similar vein, Nick Leeson commented "I suppose, I became indoctrinated by the lure of the salaries that were available and the whispered rumours of bonuses that were available" (Journal.ie, 19 Oct. 2011) . These examples show that a misalignment of the interests of individuals and their employers (be it mutual funds, unit trusts, banks, pension funds, or corporations) may lead to severe problems. It is likely that specific compensation schemes induce suboptimal trading behavior that may ultimately lead to poor performance and significant corporate losses.
However, still little is known about how bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the influence of bonus schemes on traders' willingness to trade and on their performance. In contrast, a considerable number of studies have been made on fund managers' (but not on traders' incentives). A broad literature postulates a convex relationship between fund managers' compensation and funds' past performance through new money inflows and investigates fund managers' response to those incentives (Kempf, Ruenzi, & Thiele 2009; Farnsworth & Taylor 2006; Chevalier and Ellison 1997) . Although from a theoretical perspective convex compensation schemes should lead to higher risk taking and higher profits compared to linear ones, Coval and Shumway (2005) and Liu et al. (2010) find that higher risk-taking does not result in higher returns for professional traders and market makers.
Traders' bonus schemes may serve roles other than inducing traders to higher risktaking. For example, they may be designed to increase trading intensity. This would be particularly relevant if a professional market maker would earn higher profits by placing more trades or larger trades. However, empirical evidence suggests that such strategies also do not necessarily lead to increased performance. Indeed, Garvey and Wu (2010) document that for professional traders higher trading activity on the last day of their evaluation period results in poorer performance due to higher transaction costs and poor market timing.
Likewise, Odean (2000, 2001) demonstrate that for individual investors higher trading activity is likely to result in poorer performance due to higher transaction costs.
To investigate how traders react to different incentive schemes, we set up an experiment to study trading behavior under controlled market conditions. Specifically, we study trading intensity and performance. We compare the impact of two different bonus schemes: (i) a linear scheme, which we use as benchmark and always pays a fixed percentage of the total profit; and (ii) a threshold scheme, which is frequently used in the industry and pays an increased percentage of the total profit as each threshold is reached (after which the payment increases linearly until the next threshold is reached). Linear, but especially threshold bonus schemes are widely used by banks and funds, but the amounts, thresholds, and other details seem strictly confidential. 2 In a wider context, our study relates to the literature on the effects of incentives on performance in psychology and economics. In their overview based on 131 experimental papers, Bonner et al. (2000) show that quota schemes are the most likely to evoke positive incentive effects, such as higher effort levels or higher performance. A quota scheme is an example of a threshold scheme; it pays a lump-sum amount once a certain performance level is reached, i.e., it involves a specific goal. In terms of providing incentives to improve performance, threshold schemes are followed by linear ones, tournaments, and fixed-rate schemes 3 . Importantly, none of the papers considered by Bonner et al. (2000) deals with trading activity or market participation; the studies in their literature survey on incentive schemes consider relatively simple tasks such as recalling words or solving arithmetical problems with no risk or uncertainty involved. In contrast, Kohlmeyer and Drake (2009) find that in a financial decision-making context threshold a bonus scheme does not increase risktaking in new project selection relative to a linear bonus scheme. Our study focuses on trading, a simultaneously risky and effort-eliciting activity. So we conjecture that a threshold bonus scheme is likely to increase (relative to a linear bonus scheme) the level of effort exercised by traders, which increases their trading intensity.
Conjecture 1 Trading intensity is higher under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme.
According to Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) , threshold goals may serve as reference points. Thus, the trading performance should be evaluated in accordance with the value function of a corresponding reference point as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Accordingly, outcomes below the goal are coded by a trader as losses and those above the goal as gains. Loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity result in high trading intensity and risk-seeking below the goal and low trading intensity and risk aversion above the goal. Thus, once the threshold is reached, the pressure to perform well decreases significantly and as a result trading intensity drops.
Conjecture 2 Once a bonus scheme threshold is met, trading intensity decreases.
In contrast to the above benefits of threshold bonus schemes, the behavioral literature suggests that the requirement to reach specific performance thresholds may lead to suboptimal decision making. Kohn (1993) writes: "Do rewards motivate people? Absolutely! They motivate people to get rewards." In other words, the threshold may itself become a target at the expense of the actual target, which is to make optimal trading decisions.
Moreover, Bonner et al. (2000) and Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) find that incentives are less likely to improve performance in difficult tasks or in tasks where the gap between task difficulty and subjects' skill is substantial. Trading in the stock market is a difficult task, which requires significant mental effort to detect information related to future stock performance. Hence, we argue that while the threshold bonus scheme may induce higher 3 Under linear schemes every piece of output is rewarded with an equal payment; in tournaments the winner gets all while the others get nothing; and under fixed-rate schemes the payment does not depend on performance. effort, it may fail to improve performance. Thus, their performance may suffer from excessive trading.
Conjecture 3 Under the threshold bonus scheme, traders harm their performance by trading more (even when transaction costs are zero).
The previous literature suggests that past market 4 returns significantly affect investor behavior (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007; Statman, Thorley & Vonkink, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 2009; Shi & Wang, 2010) . Moreover, high performance of specific stocks may catch investors' attention and result in higher trading activity in those stocks (Cooper, Dimitrov, & Rau, 2001; Bae & Wang, 2012) . In our experiment subjects trade only one stock and if it performs well then they may expect higher future returns which would subsequently augment trading intensity, transaction frequency and transaction size. 5 To assess the impact of the market conditions, we vary the stock profitability in our experiment (high vs. low profitability conditions). Under high profitability conditions it is relatively easy to earn money as average share price returns of the experimental stock are high, whereas under low profitability conditions returns are lower and only elaborated trading strategies may result in good performance.
Conjecture 4
Trading intensity is higher under favorable market conditions. We employ a two (bonus scheme: linear vs. threshold) by two (session profitability: low vs. high) between-subject experimental design. The linear bonus scheme always pays a fixed percentage of the profit earned by traders as their bonus. The threshold bonus scheme is piecewise linear; it sets two explicit performance goals at which a higher bonus and a steeper performance-bonus relationship can be reached. In particular, under the high-profitability conditions the lower threshold is relatively easy to reach, whereas under the low-profitability conditions, the same threshold is relatively difficult to attain.
We report a set of interesting results. First, under the threshold bonus scheme the traders trade more intensively than under the linear one. Moreover, under the former scheme, trading intensity significantly depends on whether or not a threshold is reached. Trading 4 5 In addition, it has been shown that traders credit themselves for success and positive performance, while attributing failures and negative performance to external factors such as bad luck or others' mistakes. This inevitably leads to overconfidence in trading skills as the self-attribution bias prevents investors from making an objective assessment of their abilities and the resulting performance (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Gervais & Odean, 2001). intensity declines once a threshold is met; this effect is especially strong for the higher threshold. Although the threshold bonus scheme leads to higher trading intensity, it fails to induce higher performance. Indeed, the quality of the investment decisions and the final performance are significantly lower under the threshold than under the linear scheme. In our experiment, trading was costless, so the lower returns earned under the threshold scheme cannot be explained by transaction costs. We argue that reaching a threshold may itself become a target at the expense of optimal trading decisions. Thus, bonuses may be detrimental for performance at least in comparison with linear compensation schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and provides a detailed description of the two bonus schemes. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design
During fifty experimental trading rounds the participants in our experiment (whom we will call traders henceforth) acted as the employees of a trading company (see Appendix A for the experimental instructions). They bought and sold shares of a particular stock and were provided with technical and fundamental information about the company and the market (the past evolution of the share price, the company's past earnings, the analysts' earnings forecasts, and the evolution of the market index). All this information consists of real data on the US company Praxair, Inc. 6 and on the US S&P500 market index. The data processes were linearly rescaled and Praxair's name was substituted by a neutral company name so that the traders would not be able to identify the firm nor the time period. The information about changes in earnings and analysts' earnings forecasts was given every third trading round (since Praxair reports on a quarterly basis and the share price and market data are on a monthly basis). The stock did not pay dividends and we did not provide a bid-ask spread to make sure that transaction costs were zero. The traders were price takers and they were explicitly told in the instructions that their decisions did not influence stock price and other variables.
The traders started the first round without holding any shares but with an endowment of E$500 (experimental dollars) in cash. At the beginning of every subsequent trading round, the traders received an additional E$100 in cash to ensure that they would have sufficient resources for trading. We thus enabled them to make investment decisions over the whole time span of the trading session. The total amount of cash received by each trader during the fifty rounds of the trading session was E$5,400.
Every round, traders chose how many stock shares to buy or sell (but short selling was not allowed). In each round, the traders had 15 seconds to make their investment decisions;
pre-testing showed that this interval was sufficient to make trading decisions. If a trader did not react within the given time span, a new round started, the share holdings remained unchanged and the cash holdings increased with an additional endowment of E$100. At the end of every round, traders' cumulative performance was displayed; every trader could see only his or her own performance but not that of others.
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, 2007) and all the experimental sessions took place at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The traders were undergraduate or graduate students (invited via the university website) who had previously indicated their interest in participating in paid experiments. A total of 123 students participated in the experiment: 64 females and 59 males, with an average age of 23 years.
Bonus schemes
At the beginning of the experiment, the traders were randomly assigned to one of two bonus schemes. Under the linear scheme, the traders always received 35% of the total profit. Figure   1a shows the bonus paid under the linear scheme as a function of the total return earned at the end of fifty rounds.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 around here] Table 1 and Figure 1b show the bonus paid under the threshold scheme. If the trader's total return at the end of the trading session under the threshold bonus scheme was between 0 and 25%, she received 25% of the total profit. If the total return was between 25% and 45%, she received 35%, and if the total return exceeded 45%, she received 45%. Thus, the above two thresholds served as implicit performance targets for the traders.
Both linear and threshold bonus schemes reward positive performance but do not punish for negative returns as a trader is simply not paid any bonus if her total return is below zero. Here we follow the tradition held in industry where traders' punishment for negative performance is absence of bonus payment. Obviously, in cases of extreme losses traders would face a higher probability of being fired, but in the current study we do not consider employment incentives for traders to keep things simple.
Note also that under the linear scheme non-trading does not result in a reduction in the absolute amount paid as a bonus. In other words, if a trader considers the bonus earned to be sufficiently high and does not want to take further risks, she can sell all available shares and secure the bonus paid at the end of the trading session 7 . This strategy is not feasible under the threshold scheme if a trader is above a threshold. Because the trader receives additional cash at the beginning of every round, no trading decreases her total return (expressed as a percentage of the total cash received) and hence the part of the total profit she will receive as bonus.
The final bonus was determined only by the trader's performance at the end of fifty rounds and by the type of bonus scheme (linear or threshold). The final bonus was paid to the traders privately and in cash at the rate of 1 Euro for every E$50. 8 Thus, only the total return achieved at the end of the fifty round trading session determined the amount of money traders took home after the experiment; none of the intermediate performance results directly affected the final payment.
High and low share price returns
At the beginning of the experiment, the traders were randomly assigned to one of two trading sessions that differed in terms of the average profitability of the traded stock. The stock-price process was more favorable in the "high stock return" (HighSR) session, with an average share price return of 2.35% per round. In the "low stock return" (LowSR) session, the average share price return was 0.82% per round. Table 2 compares the share price behavior in the HighSR and LowSR sessions; the average share price return session was 2.8 times larger in the HighSR than that in the LowSR session. During the HighSR session the share price increased by 183.39%, whereas the increase was merely 24.12% in the LowSR session. In other words, E$1 invested in the stock in the first trading round would be worth E$2.83 at the end of the HighSR session but only E$1.24 at the end of the LowSR session.
[Insert Table 2 around here] Taking bonus scheme and profitability conditions together, the traders were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: linear bonus scheme and low stock return session (LinLow); linear bonus scheme and high stock return session (LinHigh); threshold bonus scheme and low stock return session (ThresLow); and threshold bonus scheme and high stock return session (ThresHigh; see Table 3 ). We performed between-subject comparisons of the four treatments to identify how bonus scheme and share price profitability influence the trading behavior of traders.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Results
We structure the presentation of our results as follows: we start by analyzing trading intensity, which will subsequently be dissected into two dimensions (transaction frequency and transaction size). We then analyze the impact of bonus schemes, and of the profitability of the traded stock on trading activity. Next, we turn to a multivariate analysis of trading intensity which controls for the impact of trading information and traders' characteristics.
Finally, we focus on traders' performance and perform robustness checks.
Trading intensity
In every round, we calculate for each trader the maximum number of shares she can buy and sell. The maximum number for sale is the number of shares the trader holds as short selling is not allowed; the maximum number she can buy equals her cash holdings divided by the current share price. To test conjecture 1, we create a dependent variable called Trading Intensity, which is defined as the sum of two ratios: the number of shares bought divided by the maximum number of shares that could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided by the maximum number of shares that could be sold: If in the current round a trader neither buys nor sells shares then the Trading Intensity is zero (see Appendix B for detailed definitions of the variables). We assume that trading intensity reflects traders' beliefs about future share price development. For example, if the trader strongly believes that the share price will go up in the next round, she is likely to buy as many shares as she can in the current round and her trading intensity would equal 100%.
The trader would sell all her shares if she expects the share price to decrease in the next round. When the trader expects the share price to rise or fall with equal probability, then she will neither buy nor sell shares and will wait until the next round when more information arrives 9 . Table 4 and Figure 2 compare the four treatments in terms of average Trading Intensity. On average, 51.59% of the available shares were traded every round. There is a significant difference in average trading intensity under the linear and threshold bonus schemes (column 2 of Table 4 , Panel A), and in the HighSR and LowSR sessions (row 2 of Table 4 , Panel A). In accordance with conjecture 1, the more trading occurred under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme, with the difference amounting to 4.60% (t = 4.15, p < 0.01). Moreover, this difference stays almost the same when the LowSR and HighSR sessions are considered separately: 4.62% (t = 2.92, p < 0.01) in the LowSR session These results confirm Conjecture 1 in that the trading intensity is significantly higher under the threshold scheme than under the linear one.
In accordance with conjecture 4, trading intensity in the HighSR session was significantly higher than in the LowSR session. Indeed, the difference in average trading intensity between the HighSR and LowSR sessions is 7.03% (t = 6.33, p < 0.01). Moreover, this difference between the profitability conditions does not depend on the bonus scheme: the difference amounts to 7.09% (t = 4.46, p < 0.01) and 6.75% (t = 4.36, p < 0.01) for the linear and the threshold bonus schemes, respectively. An ANOVA also reveals no significant interactions between type of bonus scheme and stock profitability conditions ( Thus, we conclude that the threshold bonus scheme induces higher trading intensity and that higher profitability opportunities also lead to more intensive trading.
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 around here]
To investigate further what drives the differences in trading intensity between the treatments, we partition Trading Intensity into Transaction Frequency and Transaction Size.
The former is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a trader buys or sells shares in the current round (i.e., if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise. Transaction Size is defined only for those rounds in which a trader buys or sells shares (i.e., when Transaction Frequency equals 1). Table 5 and Figure 3 compare the four treatments in terms of average Transaction Frequency per trading session (of fifty rounds). The traders sold and purchased shares in more than 79% of the trading rounds. . While there was no difference in transaction frequency between high and low profitability sessions, there was a clear difference under the linear and threshold schemes. The transaction frequency is significantly higher (by 6.88%
with t = 6.66 and p < 0.01) under the threshold than under the linear scheme (column 2 of Table 5 , Panel A). The difference in transaction frequency under the two schemes provides additional support for conjecture 1. Next, we compare transaction frequency between schemes separately in the LowSR session (treatments LinLow and ThresLow) and the HighSR session (treatments LinHigh and ThresHigh). In both sessions, transaction frequency was higher in the threshold than the linear scheme (LowSR: 9.51%, t = 6.29, p < 0.01, column 3 of Table 5 , Panel A; HighSR: 4.60%, t = 3.26, p < 0.01, column 4 of Table 5 , Panel A). Since the information set was the same under both bonus schemes, the higher transaction frequency was presumably driven by the pressure to reach the implicit goals under the threshold scheme. This pressure seems to be especially high when the opportunities for good performance are limited, i.e., in the LowSR session. An ANOVA analysis (Table 5, Panel B) confirms a significant interaction effect between bonus-scheme type and stock profitability (p < 0.05). Figure 3 presents a graphical analysis of the transaction frequency under the four treatments. Thus, Table 5 and Figure 3 combined provide evidence supporting conjecture 1, namely that the threshold scheme induces more aggressive trading behavior in the form of higher transaction frequency. Moreover, contrary to conjecture 4, Transaction Frequency was not affected by profitability conditions.
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 around here] Table 6 and Figure 4 present the Transaction Size by treatment. On average, traders traded around 65.19% of the number of shares available (conditional on a transaction taking place). We unveil that transaction size does not depend on the type of bonus scheme.
However, the average Transaction Size is positively related to the profitability of the trading sessions. In the LowSR session trading amounted to 60.46% of the available shares, which is 8.81% less than in the HighSR session (69. 27%; t = 7.91, p < 0.01). The difference in Transaction Size between HighSR and LowSR session shows up for both bonus schemes; it amounts to 7.31% (t = 4.51, p < 0.01) and 10.14% (t = 6.65, p < 0.01) for the linear and threshold scheme, respectively. To sum up, under favorable profitability conditions the traders invested a higher percentage of their wealth in the stock. This result supports conjecture 4, suggesting that we primarily find support for conjecture 4 in terms of transaction size rather than frequency.
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 around here]
To conclude this section, we find that in our experiment trading activity was significantly higher under the threshold than under the linear scheme in terms of average share turnover and average transaction frequency. By extension, the results suggest that increased trading frequency may be caused not only by traders' overconfidence (Barber & Odean, 2001) or past individual performance (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2001; Statman, Thorley, & Vorkink, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 2009; Nicolosi, Peng, & Zhu, 2009 ) but also by the type of bonus scheme. In contrast, the average transaction size was affected only by profitability conditions, but not by the type of bonus scheme.
Trading intensity around bonus thresholds
To investigate how trading behavior changes around the thresholds and to test conjecture 2, we plot the average transaction frequency 10 against the total return earned by the traders. We divide the total return values into intervals of five percentage points, starting from a negative performance of -5%. Then, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of the variable Transaction Frequency under the linear and threshold schemes for each interval. Finally, we depict these means and their 95% confidence intervals by performance interval to obtain a histogram of probabilities that transactions are made for different total returns ( Figure 5 ). Figure 5a shows, as expected, that there are no significant differences between the average transaction frequencies across the total return intervals 11 under the linear scheme. 10 We use the average transaction frequency instead of the trading intensity because we showed in the previous section that the transaction frequency is affected by the type of bonus scheme but not by the profitability conditions. 11 The 95% confidence intervals of the transaction frequency are especially wide for very high (above 70%) and very low (below -5%) performance because of the small number of observations.
Under the threshold scheme the behavior changes significantly once the thresholds are met ( Figure 5b ). In accordance with conjecture 2, after reaching a threshold, the traders made [Insert Figure 5 around here]
Trading intensity in a multivariate setting.
We analyze the influence of bonus schemes and stock-price profitability on trading behavior by investigating the transaction intensity, frequency, and size in a multivariate setting: To match the traders' strategy we use a safety margin of 5% to determine the above intervals.
In the above equation, we add as controls the information variables (most recent stock return prior to a trade, the market return, the earnings, and the earnings' forecasts), and traders' characteristics (such as risk aversion, the average percentage of trader's total wealth invested in stock, her total return to date, and the change in her total return to date since the last round) (see appendix B for definitions).
To control for the information available to traders, we include the most recent share price return at the time of the transaction, the market return, earnings announcements, and analysts' earnings forecasts. Moreover, we also control for traders' characteristics, such as the total return earned by a trader from the beginning of the trading session to the current round (Total Return to Date) and change in her total return since the last round (Change in Total Return). Because higher risk aversion is likely to decrease trading intensity 13 , we include in the regression analysis a measure of traders' risk attitude: the average percentage of a trader's wealth invested in the stock (Average % in Stock). This variable is a proxy for traders' risk attitudes since more risk tolerant traders are more likely to invest more into the risky asset 14 .
Trading intensity, propensity, and size
For the dependent variable Trading Intensity, we estimate a Tobit model, because short selling and borrowing cash were not allowed in our experimental setting. Models (1) and (2) of Table 7 estimate the influence of the type of bonus scheme and stock profitability on the trading intensity. We confirm that under the threshold scheme a higher percentage of shares is traded: in models (1) and (2) Odean (1998) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) mainly consider the effect of overconfidence on trading behavior. However, after controlling for overconfidence it can be shown that in their models trading volume decreases with greater risk aversion. 14 As an alternative control for risk aversion we also used Laury (2002, 2005) measure, which did not influence our main results. [Insert Table 7 around here]
To further assess how bonus-scheme types and profitability conditions influence trading activity, we dissect trading intensity into the propensity to trade (transaction frequency) (logit models (3) and (4) of Table 7 ) and transaction size (models (5) and (6). The
ThresBS dummy is positive and significant (for models (3) and (4), the p-values are below 1%), suggesting that the traders are more likely to trade under the threshold than under the linear scheme. We confirm that trading frequency significantly decreases when a threshold is passed with a 5% safety margin: the coefficients on Return [30%, 35%] x ThresBS, and Return [50%, 55%] x ThresBS are both negative and significant at the 5% level (t = 2.60, p < 0.01 and t = 2.41, p < 0.05). We also find a significantly negative interaction effect between bonus scheme type and profitability conditions: the coefficient on ThresBS x HighSR is negative and significant (for model (3) with t = 2.10, p < 0.05). So, whereas the probability to make a transaction was higher under the threshold than under linear scheme, this effect was moderated under high profitability conditions (see also Fig. 3) . The combined effect of threshold scheme and high profitability conditions is significantly positive (χ 2 = 11.80, p < 0.01). However, this effect disappears once we include the thresholds in the regression in model (4).
Tobit regressions with Transaction Size as a dependent variable are presented in Table   7 (models (5) and (6)). Surprisingly, the threshold scheme does not affect the transaction size:
the ThresBS coefficient is not significant in models (5) and (6). However, we find a significantly positive interaction effect between ThresBS and HighSR: the coefficient on Thresh x HighSR is positive and significant at the 5% level (see also Fig.4) (1)-(2) and (5)- (6)). More specifically, if the total return earned by traders'
in the current round in higher than in the previous one , then trading intensity decreases mostly because traders start trading smaller stakes: the coefficient on Change in Total Return is negative and significant at the 5% level -models (1)- (2) and (5)-(6). This result is in line with predictions from prospect theory that people tend to become more (less) risk averse when their performance is above (below) their reference point (the previous round performance in our case).
The share of a trader's wealth invested in stocks (Average % in Stock), which could be seen as a proxy for risk tolerance in the investment domain, is positively related to trading intensity (both transaction frequency and size). So traders with higher risk tolerance traded more frequently and at higher stakes: the coefficient on Average % in Stock is positive and significant for all models (1)- (6).
The influence of the information variables is in line with our expectations. It seems that the participants were using technical rather fundamental information: Stock Return and Market Return have a positive and strongly significant effect on trading intensity and its two dimensions (frequency and size), whereas earnings and their forecast did not affect trading behavior.
Performance
In the previous sections, we have shown that under the threshold bonus scheme traders traded more actively than under the linear one. On the one hand, there are reasons why one could expect that higher trading intensity under the threshold scheme does not necessarily result in poor performance. For example, the desire to earn more money and to reach thresholds may make people think harder, estimate market opportunities better, and finally make better decisions. On the other hand, increased transaction frequency may result in lower performance due to higher transaction costs (Barber & Odean, 2000 , mediocre stock picking (Shi & Wang, 2010) , or inferior market timing (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007) . Our experimental market contains only one stock (i.e., does not allow for stock picking) and does not involve any transaction costs. Hence, our set-up enables us to study the effect of the bonus scheme type on market timing. To this effect, we compare the quality of the trading decisions under the different bonus schemes.
To maximize their final personal payoff, the traders needed to maximize their return at the end of the trading session of 50 rounds. Since the share did not pay dividends and short selling was not possible in our experiment, the strategy "buy low and sell high" was the only one that could provide positive returns. Traders could try to implement this strategy by buying stocks before the share price went up and by selling them before the share price went down. To estimate the quality of the trading decisions, we calculate the difference in the share price returns after stock share were bought and sold. If this difference is positive on average, the traders made good investments and on average correctly predicted/guessed the share price movements.
We calculate the difference in the returns as follows. First, we calculate an average purchase-based return. For all the rounds in which a trader has bought shares, we calculate an average next-round stock return, i.e., we sum all the next-round stock-price returns for the rounds in which a trader bought shares and divide that sum by the total number of rounds in which shares were bought. Then, using the same procedure, we compute an average salebased stock-price return and subtract it from the average purchase-based stock return. The deduction we call Return Difference.
is 1 when trader i buys shares and 0 when she sells shares. Conjecture 3 states that under the threshold scheme traders make poorer investment decisions because of the pressure to reach the targets. This effect must be especially prominent in the LowSR session when it is more difficult to reach the thresholds and the pressure to perform higher. Table 8 compares the four treatments in terms of average Return Difference.
[Insert Table 8 around here] Table 8 shows that on average traders make significantly poorer investment decisions under the threshold scheme than under the linear scheme (column 2 of Table 8 ). The average difference in share price returns after buying and selling shares is 1.58% under the linear scheme, whereas it is only 0.36% under the threshold scheme. The difference between the two values is positive (1.22%) and significant (t = 2.69, p < 0.01). This pattern holds in both profitability sessions: in the LowSR session the difference between the average share price purchase-based and sale-based returns is 1.42% higher under the linear than under the threshold bonus scheme (t = 2.00, p < 0.05). In the HighSR session, the average Return Difference under the linear bonus scheme exceeds the one under the threshold bonus scheme by only 0.98% and this difference is weakly significant (t = 1.74, p < 0.10). Thus, under the threshold scheme, the traders did not make better investment decisions than under the linear scheme. On the contrary, their attention to the implicit targets and the pressure to perform well has made them worse investors, which supports conjecture 3. As a robustness check, we calculated a volume-based difference in returns whereby the next round return after a purchase (sale) is multiplied by the percentage of shares bought (sold) and conclude that the results remain virtually unchanged (not reported here).
The difference between the average purchase-based and sale-based returns in the LowSR session is 1.58% and in the HighSR session is 0.43% (Row 2 of Table 8 ). This implies that the two profitability conditions are statistically distinct in terms of the quality of traders' investment decisions (t = 2.50, p < 0.05). In the LowSR session, the traders made better decisions: they bought shares before the share price went up and they sold shares before the share price went down. Thus, when earning money by trading was relatively difficult, the traders may have collected more information about the relationships between the share price and the market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, applied more effort to understand those relationships, and they finally performed better. In contrast, under high profitability conditions, they seemed to merely chase high returns. Previous research has shown similar patterns in investors' behavior during bull and bear markets: Japanese and
Chinese investors made inferior investment decisions during bull markets in comparison with
bear markets due to poorer market timing and stock selection (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007; Shi & Wang, 2010) . A comparable result was found for mutual fund investors across the business cycle (Cederburg, 2008) .
The above results are based on the returns calculated after the trade. We now evaluate the actual average performance obtained over the entire trading session. Did traders under the threshold scheme do better? Were they able to exploit the different share price profitability
conditions? To answer these questions we compare the final returns earned by the traders at the end of the trading session of 50 rounds between the four treatments (see Table 9 ). We use the Final Total Return variable which is defined as Total Return to Date at the 50 th round. If we pool the observations from the two profitability sessions, the difference in final returns between the two bonus schemes is insignificant (column 2 Table 9 ). In the LowSR session (column 3 [Insert Table 9 around here]
As expected, traders' returns at the end of 50 th round are significantly influenced by the profitability conditions. The average returns earned at the end of the LowSR and HighSR sessions are 11.86% and 35.07% respectively (row 2, Table 9 ); thus, their difference equals -23.21% and is statistically significant (t = 8.74, p < 0.01). Under both bonus schemes this result remains significant. It should be noted that in the setup of this realistic experiment, both the profitability conditions and the bonus schemes have an impact on the total returns and hence the traders' bonus. While the share price and market evolution cannot significantly be influenced by traders or their employers, the traders' compensation schemes are nevertheless under the direct control of the companies.
Robustness checks
The performance near the end of the trading sessions contains more noise because the traders traded less at the end of the trading session. As a robustness check, we compare the average returns earned by the traders in the second half of the trading session, i.e., at the end of the 25 th round and later. Table 10 demonstrates that the results are consistent with those described in the previous section; the significance levels are much higher because of the increased number of observations.
To investigate whether or not the poorer performance under the threshold scheme is driven by lower risk-taking, we compare the average share of wealth invested in the stock for each of the four treatments. We find no difference between the average shares of wealth invested in the stock by type of bonus scheme (see Table 11 ). Thus, under the threshold scheme, the traders perform worse because they make poorer decisions, and their inferior performance does not follow from a difference in risk tolerance.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 around here]
Conclusion
To study the impact of different types of bonus schemes on the trading intensity of individual traders, we set up an experimental market in which traders sell and buy shares without transaction costs. The traders are price takers and are provided with fundamental and technical information (evolution of the market index, past share price evolution, realized earnings, and analysts' earnings forecasts). We trade off a basic linear bonus scheme against a threshold bonus scheme, both of which reflect the practice in investment banks and brokerage houses.
A first solid finding is that the threshold bonus scheme induces a higher trading intensity than a linear bonus scheme. When dissecting trading intensity into two dimensions, transaction frequency and transaction size, we document that the threshold scheme does indeed induce more aggressive trading behavior in the form of higher transaction frequency, but that the transaction size does not depend on the type of bonus scheme.
We also examine how the context of high and low profitability conditions (periods with higher and lower average share price returns) affects trading intensity. High profitability leads to a higher trading intensity only under the threshold bonus scheme, which is mainly explained by the execution of larger transactions. Considering four treatments consisting of the combination of types of bonus scheme and profitability conditions, we conclude that a threshold scheme induces frequent trading and trading at higher stakes, especially in trading sessions with high profitability conditions.
After reaching a return threshold that translates into a higher bonus, traders make significantly fewer transactions. Interestingly, the mean number of transactions does not drop immediately after the threshold, but in the next intervals, which implies that traders apply a 5% safety margin above the threshold before they decrease their transaction frequency.
To estimate the quality of the trading decisions, we examine the difference in the share price returns after the traders bought and sold shares as well as their overall performance over the whole trading session. If these differences are positive on average, the traders make good investments and on average correctly predict/guess the share price movements. We find that the traders make significantly poorer investment decisions under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. This effect is especially pronounced when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (in trading sessions with lower profitability conditions). Then, the traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between the share price and the market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, apply more effort to understand those relationships, and finally perform better under the linear bonus scheme, whereas under the threshold bonus scheme they seem to focus merely on reaching and maintaining threshold returns. Thus, we show that bonuses may be detrimental for performance at least when threshold and linear compensation schemes are compared. 
Figure 1 Payoffs under linear and threshold bonus schemes

LinHigh
Trading is under the Linear scheme and in the High Share Return session.
ThresLow
Trading is under the Threshold scheme and in the Low Share Return session.
ThresHigh
Trading is under the Threshold scheme and in the High Share Return session. Table 9 Returns earned by traders at end of trading session by bonus scheme and profitability treatments Table 10 Returns earned by traders in second half (at the end of 25 th round and later) of trading session When you sell shares:
Table 4 Trading Intensity by bonus scheme and profitability treatments
• your cash holdings are increased and your share holdings are decreased by the number of shares sold multiplied by the current share price; • the number of shares you own decreases by the number of shares sold.
If you do not buy nor sell any shares, then the number of shares you own stays the same, but the value of your shares may increase or decrease depending on the share price movement. See example 2.
Example 2
►In the beginning of the current round you own 20 shares and E$1,000 cash. The current share price is E$10.
The share holdings are 20xE$10 = E$200 and the total holdings are E$1,200.
You buy 10 more shares at the current price and spend E$100 cash such that you have E$900 left (E$900 = E$1,000 -E$100).
In the next round the share price rises up to E$15 and your share holdings equal 30 shares x E$15 = E$450.
In the beginning of the next round you will have E$1000 in cash because you also receive E$100 extra cash from Aurum in the beginning of each round. 
Screenshot of a trading stage
This screen shows the information helpful in your investment decisions:
• Egias' share price,
• the market index, • Egias' earnings information (past and forecast),
• your current holdings and performance;
• in the same screen you can make your investment decisions.
The upper right corner of the screen shows the time remaining for your decision in the current round. The screen will appear for 15 seconds. Within 15 seconds you must specify your decision whether you want to buy or sell shares. If you do not reach any decision within 15 sec, you will proceed to the next round with your share holdings unchanged.
To the left you see past Egias' earnings and earnings forecast. You also see percentage changes in earnings and earnings forecasts from the last past round and the graphs of historical values of earnings and earnings forecasts (up to 12 past rounds), which give you a broader picture and could allow you to identify a link between earnings and their forecasts.
► Company's earnings are an after-tax profit (or loss), which a company produces during a specific time period. For example, Egias calculates and reports its earnings every three rounds. In some periods companies generate profit (and their earnings are positive), whereas in other periods companies can incur losses (earnings are negative). On the screen you see Egias' earnings per share (earnings divided by the number of shares outstanding, which is constant throughout all sessions).
► An earnings forecast is value of earnings expected by analysts for the next period. Analyst is a person who studies company's accounts, strategy, and economic outlook. On the screen you see the average expected value from many analysts.
In the right bottom corner you see the current market index value, its percentage change from the last past round, and a graph of its historical values (up to 12 past rounds).
► The market index measures the price changes of the overall stock market, which consists of all publicly traded companies. Changes in the market index reflect changes in the whole economy. For example, a recession is typically accompanied by a drop in the market index and the economic expansion goes along with an increase in the market index.
The share price may be influenced by past earnings, earnings forecast, and by the market index movements, but the degree of this relation may in some time periods be strong or weak and may occasionally be inversed.
In the right upper corner you see the current share price, its percentage change and the graph of its historical values (up to 12 past rounds).
The central part of the screen contains the following four boxes (down):
1. Round shows the current round and the total number of rounds in the current trading session. 2. Performance shows your current reward, the total return you earned for Aurum and the total investment you received from Aurum. 3. Holdings shows your current cash and share holdings, including the number of shares owned. Total holdings equal the sum of cash and share value. 4. Decision, where you can specify the number of shares you want to buy or sell.
a. If you want to buy shares, specify the number you want to buy in the upper blue box. Leave it blank if you don't want to buy any shares. b. If you want to sell shares, specify the number you want to sell in the lower blue box. Leave it blank if you don't want to sell any shares. c. If you don't want to buy nor sell any shares, leave both blue boxes blank. d. Press the button "Do it!" when you are ready with your investment decisions and you will automatically proceed to the next round. If you don't press the button before the time is over, then your decisions will not be executed.
The experimental stock market employs real historical share price, earnings, earnings forecast, and market index data. So it is fully independent from your decisions/performance or the decisions/performance of other participants.
Reward calculation
For your services you will receive a reward. It depends on your own performance: the more you earn for Aurum, the more you get as a reward. Your reward is calculated at the end of each trading session and constitutes a fixed percent, 35% of the additional money holdings -investment) you earned for Aurum over the entire 50 rounds.
If total return > 0, then reward = (holdings If total return is negative, then your reward is zero.
Total return = (holdings -investment) / i
Example 3
►After 50 rounds your holdings (combined in cash and shares) equal E$7,400, whereas the total investment from Aurum was E$5,400.
So you have earned E$7,400 return is E$2,000 / E$5,400 = 32.07% > 0.
Your reward is E$2,000 x 35% = E$700 = Below is a graph of the final reward depending on total return you earn for Aurum at the end of the trading session.
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our services you will receive a reward. It depends on your own performance: the more you earn for Aurum, the more you get as a reward. Your reward is calculated at the end of each trading session and constitutes a fixed percent, 35% of the additional money (additional money = investment) you earned for Aurum over the entire 50 rounds.
If total return > 0, then reward = (holdings -investment) x 35%
If total return is negative, then your reward is zero.
investment) / investment
After 50 rounds your holdings (combined in cash and shares) equal E$7,400, whereas the total investment from Aurum was E$5,400.
So you have earned E$7,400 -E$5,400 = E$2,000 of additional money for Aurum and the total 00 / E$5,400 = 32.07% > 0.
Your reward is E$2,000 x 35% = E$700 = €14. ◄
Below is a graph of the final reward depending on total return you earn for Aurum at the end of our services you will receive a reward. It depends on your own performance: the more you earn for Aurum, the more you get as a reward. Your reward is calculated at the end of each (additional money = After 50 rounds your holdings (combined in cash and shares) equal E$7,400, whereas the total E$5,400 = E$2,000 of additional money for Aurum and the total Below is a graph of the final reward depending on total return you earn for Aurum at the end of
Performance stage
After the decision stage you will be shown a screen with your performance to date (resulting from the previous rounds) for 2 sec. Your current reward, the total return earned for Aurum, and investment will appear in the upper box of the screen. In the lower box you will see a graphical representation of your reward depending on the total return earned for Aurum. On the graph the x-axis is the total return earned for Aurum, and the y-axis is your reward. Two arrows show your current performance in terms of reward and the total return earned for Aurum.
Screenshot of a performance stage
Final payoff
You earn €2 for showing up. The variable part of your payment depends on your performance during the experiment. Your final payoff will be randomly chosen from two rewards earned in the two trading sessions.
For example,
• E$650 (€13) is your reward in the 1st trading session • E$800 (€16) is your reward in the 2nd trading session
One trading session will be randomly selected to determine your payment. You will be paid your total reward in cash and in private at the end of the experiment. Now you will start with a training session, which aims to familiarize you with the experimental environment and does not count towards your final payment.
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Appendix B. Variable definitions
Variable name Description
Average % in Stock Average percentage of a trader's wealth invested in the stock over the trading session.
Change in Total Return
Difference between total return earned by a trader from the beginning of the trading session to the current round (Total Return to Date) and total return earned from the beginning of the trading session to the previous round, in percentage points.
Earnings Return
Return in earnings relative to previous round (current versus previous round), in percentage points.
Final Total Return
Return earned by a trader at the end of the trading session, which equals Total Return at the 50 th round Forecasted Earnings Return Most recent forecasted earnings return (current versus previous round), in percentage points.
HighSR
Dummy for the high-stock-return session, which equals 1 if the current trading session has high-profitability conditions and 0 otherwise.
Market Return
Most recent return of the market index (current versus previous round), in percentage points. Return Difference Average share price return for the rounds after purchases minus average share price return for the rounds after sales.
Round Number
Number of the current trading round.
ThresBS
Dummy for the threshold bonus scheme, which equals 1 if in the current trading session a trader operates under the threshold scheme and zero for the linear bonus scheme.
ThresBS x HighSR
Interaction term between ThresBS and HighSR.
Total Return to Date Total return earned by a trader from the beginning of the trading session to the current round, in percentage points.
Trading Intensity
The number of shares bought divided by the maximum number that could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided by the maximum number that could be sold.
Transaction Frequency
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if a trader buys or sells shares in the current round (i.e., if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise.
Transaction Size
Number of shares bought (sold) divided by the maximum number of shares the trader could have bought (sold) if a trader buys (sells) shares in the current round.
Stock Return
Most recent stock return (current versus previous round), in percentage points.
